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Abstract: It is commonly asserted that, when it comes to democratic politics, ‘small is 
beautiful’. This assumption harks back to antiquity and is employed by advocates of 
participatory and deliberative democracy to justify innovations that ‘scale-down’ decision-
making in large states. Despite their obvious relevance, this literature fails to account for the 
democratic experience of the world's smallest states. In this article, I bring small states in to 
this discussion by examining recent democratic innovations in Tuvalu. Rather than ‘scaling-
down’, in this instance Tuvalu is attempting to ‘scale-up’ its democratic institutions due to 
the challenges posed by its small size. The lesson for advocates of decentralisation in large 
states and the orthodox view that ‘small is beautiful’ is a cautionary one: size matters but not 
necessarily in the manner democratic theory predicts or in ways that fulfil normative desires. 
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As the tasks of the state have become more complex and the size of polities larger and 
more heterogeneous, the institutional forms of liberal democracy developed in the 
nineteenth century – representative democracy plus technocratic bureaucratic 
administration – seem increasingly ill suited to the novel problems we face in the 
twenty-first century (Fung and Wright, 2001, p. 5). 
Modern representative democracies are said to be facing a ‘crisis’, usually defined as 
a combination of declining voter turnout and party memberships, and rising disaffection with 
politicians and democratic institutions (Dalton, 2004; Stoker, 2006; Hay, 2007; Flinders, 
2012). Much of the literature offering solutions to this malaise draws its inspiration from 
antiquity and the belief that when it comes to democracy ‘small is beautiful’ (Laslett 1956; 
Schumacher, 1973; Dahl and Tufte, 1973). The argument is that large size and the distance it 
creates between rulers and ruled has caused ‘the erosion of democratic vitality’ which ‘is an 
inevitable result of complexity and size’ (Diamond, 1999; Fung and Wright, 2001, p. 6). The 
effect of this deficit, proponents claim, is increasing disenchantment and disillusionment 
among citizens about the performance of their governments and the processes and practices 
of democratic representation (Dalton, 2004; Stoker, 2006; Smith, 2009). 
Democratic theorists working in participatory and deliberative traditions offer the 
democracy-enhancing possibilities of small polities as a potential cure to the problem of large 
size in countries ranging from the United States to Brazil and India (Fung and Wright, 2001; 
Smith, 2009; Pateman, 2012). Making democracies more ‘face to face’ (Laslett, 1956), they 
argue, will deepen citizen involvement in decision-making. Typically, advocates champion 
reforms to decentralise, devolve or localise representative institutions to increase 
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participation (Stoker, 2004; 2006). Or they favour deliberative opinion polls (Fishkin, 1991; 
Ackerman and Fishkin, 2002), citizen juries (Smith and Wales, 2000), citizens’ assemblies 
(Barber, 1984; Fung and Wright, 2001; Warren and Pearse, 2008) and participatory 
budgeting (Pateman, 2012; Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2014) to improve deliberation.  
This article investigates democratic reform in one of the world’s smallest sovereign 
states, Tuvalu, whose size (population 10,800) is comparable to the old Greek cities. Tuvalu 
represents a ‘most likely’ case (Eckstein, 1975) from which to explore the much-vaunted 
democratising effects of smallness (Veenendaal and Corbett, 2015). Specifically, I examine a 
recent democratic innovation by the Parliament of Tuvalu whereby the Public Accounts 
Committee (PAC) – the most active parliamentary committee in Tuvalu – co-opted a least 
one citizen (but often two or three) to work alongside three Members of Parliament (MP) to 
review the government budget. The innovation lasted for roughly a decade—the mid-2000s 
to mid-2010s. By asking how and why this institutional change came about in Tuvalu, and 
how effective the actors involved considered it to be, I provide a critical focal lens through 
which to interrogate perennial questions about the relationship between size and democracy.  
This article is premised on the assumption that the experience of the world’s smallest 
countries is central to any discussion about the ideal size of a democratic polity (there are 
currently 21 UN member states with populations under 250,000 and 39 under 1 million). 
Many of the most innovative departures from institutional orthodoxy have occurred in the 
world’s smallest states (Wettenhall, 2001, p. 183; Wettenhall and Thynne, 1994). And so, 
based on this logic, any holistic understanding of the impact of size on democracy must, 
almost by definition, pay attention to their experience (Veenendaal and Corbett, 2015). 
To unpack the effects of institutional change in this case, I use the framework 
developed by Smith (2009) for assessing the participatory and deliberative potential of 
democratic innovations. Drawing on both the public record and in-depth interviews, I find 
that political actors in Tuvalu recount persistent challenges with adapting institutional 
features ostensibly designed for large states, to a small state context. This predicament 
presents an inversion of the scalar problem as identified above: rather than ‘scaling-down’, 
the challenges of small size have underpinned a desire to ‘scale-up’ the practices of 
democratic politics so that they function more like how they are said to work in large states. 
The lesson from the Tuvaluan experience for scholars interested in the potential for 
democratic reform to emulate the characteristics of smallness in large states is a cautionary 
one: small size bestows mixed blessings (cf Corbett, 2015). Specifically, the Tuvaluan case 
illustrates that ‘scaling-down’ politics does not necessarily deepen community engagement in 
the way the existing literature suggests; while it also serves to remind us that being small also 
creates challenges of its own. That is, while my aim here is not in any way to denigrate how 
politics is conducted in Tuvalu, the case offers important cautionary insights for scholars 
interested in the democratising potential of small size.  
The article has six parts. First, I briefly unpack the longstanding debates about 
democracy and smallness. Second, I provide a concise summary of Smith’s (2009) 
framework for assessing democratic innovations. Third, I summarise the methodological 
approach I adopt and the data I have collected. Fourth, I offer a brief background of 
democratic institutions in Tuvalu so as to situate the recent PAC innovation. Fifth, I provide 
an in-depth case study of recent changes to Tuvalu’s PAC by drawing on the views and 
experiences of the political actors involved. Finally, I conclude by revisiting the theoretical 
implications of this case and discuss the more general lessons that the experience of small 
states offers.  
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Theorising democracy and smallness  
As outlined, extolling the normative potential of small polities has a rich theoretical 
tradition in Anglo-European scholarship. Indeed, the global spread of democratic norms and 
values, which locates popular sovereignty at the heart of political and social life, places the 
spatial dimensions of representation at the core of its normative appeal. Invariably, calls to 
modify existing institutions and power structures, be they 19th and 20th century empires or 
21st century representative democracies, make the case for change on the grounds that ‘scaled 
down’ polities more authentically reflect the will of the people and thus allow citizens to 
more deliberately construct the common good. Be it decolonisation, separatist movements or 
more recent ideas like participatory and deliberative democracy, the outcome of this move is 
a historical shift to smaller and smaller political units (Lake and O’Mahony, 2004). The 
history of Tuvalu is symptomatic of this global trend and yet its experience with 
democratisation does not fit neatly within the assumptions that participatory and deliberative 
democrats in particular make about the democratising potential of small-scale representation. 
Scholars interested in the democratising effects of small size on democratic 
innovations have largely overlooked the practice of politics in small states: Humphreys, 
Masters and Sandbu (2006) and Oppong (2016) are notable exceptions. Despite drawing 
inspiration from the famously democratic Greek cities, the temporal and institutional 
differences between ancient and modern states mean that comparisons with democratic life in 
antiquity provide limited insights into the challenges and possibilities of contemporary 
democratic institutions in large states (although this has not always stopped the comparison 
being made). To get around this problem, proponents of ‘scaled down’ democracy bolster 
their argument with work in comparative politics where scholars identify a strong positive 
correlation between small size and sustained democratic transition (Ott, 2000, Anckar, 2002, 
Srebrnik, 2004). And yet, despite placing this link at the centre of their argument (Diamond, 
1999) they tend to ignore how politics actually works in these settings (Baldacchino, 2012; 
Veenendaal, 2014; 2015). 
The turn towards questions about scale by critical democratic theorists has been 
paralleled by a turn away from the statist (territorial and institutional) features of democracy 
by political geographers (Mountz, 2013). Increasingly, scholars working in this tradition have 
sought to displace state-centrism by focusing instead on the scalar dimensions of 
globalisation and associated non-state movements (Brenner, 1999; Marston, 2004; Pugh, 
2009). As a result, the critical insight that this literature offers democratic theorists – that 
spatial labels are socially constructed and sustained – has been overlooked. While 
acknowledging that the label ‘small state’ – considered here as a polity with a resident 
population of one million or less – is defined in reference to ‘large states’, I nevertheless 
employ the term as a lens through which to interrogate and ultimately critique appeals to the 
normative desirability of distinct scalar types by deliberative and participatory democrats. In 
so doing, I acknowledge that these are diverse literatures. However, given that they often 
make similar presumptions about the benefits of smallness, this Tuvalu case offers important 
insights for both.  
Democratic innovations: Smith’s framework 
Smith (2009, p. 1) defines democratic innovations as departures from the traditional 
institutional architecture that we normally associate with democracy (elections, opinion 
polling, focus groups, and so forth). Specifically, he is interested in mechanisms that seek to 
involve ‘lay’ or ‘non-partisan’ citizens in decision-making processes and asks whether they 
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realise ‘democratic goods’. Smith (2009, pp. 12-13) specifies six ‘goods’ that democratic 
innovations should seek to engender: 1) inclusiveness; 2) popular control; 3) considered 
judgement; 4) transparency; 5) efficiency; and 6) transferability. No single innovation is 
likely to incorporate all of these criteria equally; but by assessing democratic innovations in 
this manner, we can determine whether they enhance citizen satisfaction with democracy.  
Data and methods 
I draw on two forms of data to assess the Tuvaluan case against Smith’s (2009) 
framework. The first is the public record – a range of government documents, including 
committee reports and legislation, combined with consultancy reports and other secondary 
material – about the PAC. The second is 10 in-depth interviews conducted in 2014 with 
political actors directly involved in the work of the PAC.1  At a glance, the number of 
interviews is relatively small; but, given Tuvalu’s size and the number of people involved, it 
is, in fact, quite a large sample. Certainly, despite not canvassing the views of every actor, 
when combined with the public record, the number of interviews is sufficient to gauge the 
diversity of views and opinions about the way the PAC operates. Interviews were conducted 
both in Tuvalu and with Tuvaluan politicians living and travelling overseas. 
This article adopts an interpretive approach to data analysis (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003; 
2006). Interpretive research is typically based on constructivist-subjectivist rather than 
realist-objectivist propositions. In a case like this, interpretive researchers would anticipate 
that there would be a diversity of views about the purpose of co-opting citizens onto the PAC, 
and how effective this innovation has been (Hendriks, 2009). Rather than seeking to establish 
which is the correct view, the aim of this approach is to probe these reflections in order to 
make sense of the normative ‘traditions’ in which they are ‘situated’; actors are not 
autonomous but construct the world inter-subjectively by (re)negotiating existing ‘traditions’ 
in the face of contemporary ‘dilemmas’ (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003; 2006). As such, the 
divergent ‘meanings’ and ‘beliefs’ that actors ascribe to what they do is not just part of this 
story; they are central to it, and the goal of this article is to bring these views to light and to 
reflect on what lessons they offer to prevailing theory.  
Where appropriate, I have drawn on quotes from actors and documents to establish 
these views. In order to solicit interviews I gave assurances that, as far as possible, I would 
suppress the identity of interviewees. In some cases interviewees requested that I refrain from 
quoting them altogether (these informants were typically civil servants). Given the political 
sensitivities that surrounded the PAC, and the relative ease with which even unnamed 
informants can be identified in a small country like Tuvalu, I have taken care to meet this 
request. As a result, throughout the case material I often paraphrase the views obtained 
during interviewees using expressions like ‘some’ or ‘most’. While not ideal, this approach is 
the only appropriate course that I could have taken given the dynamics outlined above.   
The context: democratic institutions in Tuvalu 
Tuvalu is a geographically diverse country whose 10,800 citizens are spread across 
eight inhabited islands. Formerly one half of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands colony, the group 
of islands we now call Tuvalu (the name translates as ‘cluster of eight’ or ‘eight standing 
together’) became independent in 1978 after more than 80 years of British colonial rule. The 
desire of Tuvaluans to separate from the Gilbert Islands (now Kiribati) was underpinned by a 
                                               
1
 Interviewees included a former speaker (1), PAC chair (1), parliamentary (3) and co-opted members (1), 
successive clerks of parliament (3), and a representative of the audit office (1). 
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strong belief that they would be overwhelmed by the more numerous Gilbertese should they 
achieve independence together (McIntyre, 2012). Distinct language, history and culture were 
also cited as reasons for separation. Initially, Whitehall was against the spilt, arguing that 
Tuvalu was too small to function as a viable country in its own right. The United Nations 
committee on decolonisation backed this view on the grounds that, as far as possible, they 
wanted to avoid the fragmentation of colonial administrative units. In the end, both 
acquiesced to Tuvaluan demands.  
At independence, Tuvalu’s institutional arrangements were largely the product of elite 
negotiations. Ultimately, in drafting a constitution, the Ellice Island representatives to the 
legislative council of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands opted for a Westminster-inspired 
constitutional setup that included a 12-member unicameral parliament, now increased to 15 
members (Levine and Roberts, 2005). Wider public consultations about these arrangements 
took place (more than 90% of the population voted in favour of separation) but, Murray 
(1997, p. 262) argues, did not affect the design. Tuvalu thus represents an example of 
Wettenhall and Thynne’s (1994) assessment that a common experience among decolonising 
small states is the survival of colonial bureaucratic structures.  
Democratic systems typically adopt a combination of three types of veto that provide 
a check against executive authority: bicameralism, presidentialism (or separation of the 
executive from the legislature) or federalism (Shapiro, 2003). Tuvalu, like most small states 
in the Pacific (Ugyel, 2017), has none of these and, in the absence of political parties, post-
colonial politics has been characterised by perpetually shifting coalitions and executive 
instability. Disproportionate costs are one rationale for the existence of this streamlined 
institutional architecture (discussed further below), but, the adoption of Westminster style 
government was also a price Tuvalu paid for its independence (McIntyre, 2012). 
Since independence, Tuvaluans have attempted to alter these transferred institutions 
to better suit their circumstances (Levine, 1992). Section 111(2) of The Constitution of 
Tuvalu provides for bills to be sent for ‘consideration’ and ‘comment’ to each of the island 
councils following their introduction into parliament. Here is one Tuvaluan politician’s 
(author interview) description of how this system works in practice: 
And our system [is] very democratic . . . the bills from parliament . . . they come out 
to the people on each island to scrutinise. So, the MP takes the Bill and explains it to 
them, and they say “No, no” do it this way and they make the amendments as they 
want. So, it is not the second house like the House of Lords . . . the second house is 
everybody on the island who comments on the Bill.  
Councils cannot block bills but they can propose amendments. However, as Taafaki 
and Oh (1995) concede, bills are written in English and use complex legal language, and so 
communities often find their contents hard to understand, thus restricting scrutiny. Moreover, 
tradition dictates that women and youth (generally younger than 30 years of age) are largely 
absent from both island and national decision-making forums (Fraenkel, 2006; Huffer, 2006; 
Kofe and Taomia, 2006) and so, much like the ancient Greek polis, these councils tend to be 
presided over by senior men.2  
In the mid-1990s, the Tuvaluan government began a review of local government 
administration, with technical assistance from the United Nations Development Programme 
                                               
2
 Custom dictates that the eldest person (male) in the family makes decisions on behalf of the group. Exceptions 
obviously exist and there are variations between islands. 
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(UNDP) (Larmour, 1996, pp. 91-92). This process included the establishment of a Peoples’ 
Congress of local councillors, traditional leaders and NGO representatives who 
recommended greater devolution of power from Funafuti, the capital and urban centre, to 
island councils. This culminated in the Falekaupule Act 1997 which gave local assemblies on 
each of the eight islands full jurisdiction over their administrative affairs, and, as a result, 
local government fulfils many of the powers typically ascribed to the nation state in Tuvalu 
(Panapa and Fraenkel, 2008, p. 6; Oppong, 2016). For our purposes, the important point is 
that politics in Tuvalu is both small and devolved, which is why it represents such an 
important case for scholars interested in the normative potential of small size for democratic 
politics. 
There are no institutionalised political parties in Tuvalu that reflect crosscutting 
social, ethnic, geographic or ideological cleavages (Panapa and Fraenkel, 2008; Paeniu, 2012, 
p. 6). Following Westminster conventions, the group that commands a majority on the floor 
of parliament forms government with the remaining MPs forming a de facto opposition. 
Personal connections, including those from school and work, along with long-standing 
disputes and rivalries, all influence how coalitions rise and fall, as does the allocation of 
ministerial portfolios (Panapa and Fraenkel, 2008; Corbett and Fraenkel, 2016). Like 
elsewhere in the Pacific, in the absence of institutionalised political parties, governments 
formed on the floor of parliament are regularly toppled by votes-of-no-confidence. In Tuvalu, 
coalition numbers are particularly precarious (usually the parliament is split 8-7) and so the 
decision of one MP to switch sides can bring down the government.  
Attempts to combat this trend and ensure a more stable executive have included 
increasing the number of ministerial portfolios so that they match the numerical threshold of 
a minimum winning coalition. However, for the most part, these reforms have failed to 
substantially alter existing dynamics. The prevailing view is that the constant manoeuvring of 
members has a negative impact on parliamentary proceedings. In the aftermath of the 
Falekaupule Act 1997, the 1999 Report of the National Workshop on Accountability for 
Leaders of Tuvalu (Panapa and Fraenkel, 2008, p. 2), parliament had ‘failed miserably’ and 
was unable to hold ‘officials and public institutions to account for the use of public resources 
in a timely manner’ (Clements, 2000; Taafaki, 2004, p. 19; Paeniu, 2012, p. 11). It was 
against the backdrop of this sentiment that changes to the function of the PAC were adopted. 
Democratic innovation: the case of Tuvalu’s Public Accounts Committee  
The function of the PAC is outlined in a number of pieces of legislation, including the 
Public Finance Act, 1978, the Audit Act 2007, and the Parliamentary Rules of Procedure 
2008. In practice, the committee has primarily operated as a forum for ‘ordinary members’ 
(those without ministerial portfolios) to review the annual report of Tuvalu’s Auditor 
General, inquire into its contents, and report back to the parliament. The Auditor General is 
responsible to the Office of Parliament and reports directly to parliament through the Office 
of the Speaker. The Clerk of Parliament acts as the secretary for the PAC while the Auditor 
General provides technical advice. Parliament does not have the resources or staffing 
capacity to run the PAC’s secretariat function and so the Audit Office undertakes this task. 
Section 49(3) of the Rules of Procedure 2008 states that ‘The committee may at any time co-
opt one non-voting member to assist it in the performance of its functions under this Rule’. 
Between the mid-2000s and the mid-2010s, this position was a regular feature of the PAC’s 
membership.  
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The Parliament of Tuvalu has four standing committees; but the PAC is the most 
active. The Speaker appoints its three parliamentary members with the co-opted member 
appointment made on the advice of the PAC chair. There is a legal conjecture about whether 
the co-option is actually permitted by the Rules of Procedure 2008 as, in contradiction to 
Section 49(3), Section 45(7) states that ‘A select committee may co-opt as non voting 
members persons who have been but are not Members up to a limit of two-third of the 
Members of Parliament on the committee.’ On 11 April 2013, the Attorney General provided 
an opinion at the request of the Auditor General that the practices described below are in 
contravention of the Rules of Procedure 2008. This development is particularly important in 
relation to the payment of co-opted members (again, discussed further below) but also 
attempts to create new legislation that governs the operation of the PAC.   
Inclusiveness  
In line with the belief that democracies with deep citizen engagement make better 
decisions, the first criterion Smith (2009) outlines is the capacity for democratic innovations 
to overcome unequal participation. In the absence of direct democracy, purely based on its 
population size, it is hard to imagine a more inclusive or ‘face to face’ representative polity 
than that modelled by Tuvalu. As Dahl (1998, p. 110) argued, small political units are 
supposed to naturally beget greater citizen participation, and, as we saw with the Falekaupule 
Act 1997, despite its small size, and setting aside prevailing traditions that appear to side-line 
women and youth, Tuvalu has a history of further decentralising decision-making to ensure 
that the views of all its citizens are included. Yet, MPs are still subject to many of the same 
criticisms that they attract in large states (Stoker, 2006). The UNDP’s Legislative Needs 
Assessment, for example, found that members of the public were critical of MPs for being 
too distant from their island constituencies, for not seeking their views aside from at election 
time, and for not actively consulting them about key decisions before parliament (Loney, 
2009; also Spina, 2014).  
Putting this apparent paradox to one side, the prevailing view is that the decision to 
co-opt members of the public onto the PAC was not primarily taken in the interests of 
inclusiveness, but rather to boost technical capacity. As discussed, by the late 1990s, there 
was growing concern that parliament was not functioning as well as it should be (Loney, 
2009). This matched the outlook of international aid donors – substantial contributors to 
Tuvalu’s revenue – who increasingly sought to promote ‘good governance’ reforms in the 
Pacific by improving public financial management in particular (Oppong, 2016). One of the 
problems identified during this period was the ineffectiveness of Tuvalu’s parliamentary 
committee system and in particular the capacity of the PAC. In both cases, the small size of 
the parliament underpinned the perceived capacity deficit. The view was that there were not 
enough MPs with backgrounds in accounting or public finance to provide robust scrutiny of 
government policy. As one MP outlined (author interview): ‘We just needed somebody with 
the knowledge who can help out with the process’. Moreover, because governments are 
regularly toppled by votes of no confidence in Tuvalu, former ministers were often in the 
awkward position of being asked to review their own budgets. I will discuss this latter 
phenomenon below but, for now, the important point is that parliament resolved to use the 
co-opted member function primarily in the interests of boosting the technical capacity of the 
PAC not to increase inclusiveness or participation.  
In the first instance, three members were co-opted onto the committee (two former 
government officials with Treasury experience and one church pastor). I will discuss the 
politics of the selection process further below – it is a matter of some contention – but for 
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now the important point is that the co-opted members have tended to be senior men. Again, 
prevailing cultural norms aside, size underpins this trend. Co-opted members cannot be 
drawn from the largest pool of technically trained citizens – the civil service – whose budgets 
are being reviewed, and so candidates with the necessary expertise are largely restricted to 
retirees, clergy (more than 90% of Tuvaluans are members of the Tuvalu Christian Church, 
see Goldsmith, 2005) and the (very small) private sector (skills shortages in small states 
commonly require the importation of expatriate labour).  
So, the lesson in relation to Smith’s (2009) framework is that small does not always 
mean inclusive or egalitarian as certain groups, including women and youths, remain 
marginalised from both the PAC and other representative processes in Tuvalu. Indeed, while 
inclusiveness has featured as a rationale for institutional reform in the past, it was not the 
driving motivation behind changes to the PAC, which are largely concerned with improving 
the technical performance of parliament.  
Popular control 
The second criterion in Smith’s (2009) framework is the capacity of innovations to 
empower citizens: do citizens have effective control over significant elements of decision-
making? That is, recognising that all representative institutions, no matter how inclusive their 
design, do not meet the ideal of direct democracy, Smith (2009) asks us to consider whether 
citizen’s views are being increasingly taken into account on the strength of these reforms. 
Again, Tuvalu presents us with a mixed picture.  
Popular control is a watchword in large states where the bureaucratic machinery has 
become ‘depersonalised’. Conversely, echoing Laslett (1956), in small states ‘everybody 
knows everybody’ and leaders are called upon to play multiple roles; managing real or 
imagined conflicts of interest is a perpetual concern. In such circumstances, some 
interviewees believe that the public has too much control over decision-making. Conversely, 
as we saw with the Falekaupule Act 1997, despite its size, a desire to increase popular control 
is manifestly apparent in Tuvalu and, according to the UNDP (Loney, 2009), this desire 
persists notwithstanding the mid-1990s reforms. Indeed, one of the features of small societies 
is that a small elite group continues to dominate public life because its skills make it a critical 
contributor in a range of settings (Richards, 1982, p. 157; Corbett and Veenendaal, 
forthcoming). For MPs, serving constituents means being able to preferentially channel 
resources, usually obtained via access to ministerial portfolios, to island communities 
(Paeniu, 2012, p. 11). As Larmour (1999, p. 159) highlights, central governments (and 
individual ministers) in small states will take a much more detailed interest in the location 
and activity of government vehicles, ships and other equipment, as well as the design and 
construction of things like clinics and sea walls, than they would in large states. More 
generally, the civil service is the main employer in Tuvalu (most extended families have at 
least one member in the civil service) and these moneyed ‘elites’ are expected to subsidise 
numerous community activities.  
In relation to the PAC, the public has little control over the agenda, which is largely 
determined by the Auditor’s report and committee members. Co-opted members cannot vote 
on the PAC; however, this is generally seen to be of minor importance as decisions are 
usually taken on the basis of consensus with all members fully participating in deliberations. 
The process of appointing and sacking members is another way to indicate control and, again, 
there is some conjecture over where this power lies. The Attorney General’s opinion (6 
February 2013) is that the Speaker has the power to select and (potentially) dismiss members; 
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but calling meetings is the purview of the chair. In either case, the co-opted member’s 
position is largely contingent on the tacit support of both the Speaker and the Chair. They do 
not have the protection of a secure parliamentary term afforded to MPs, nor the popular 
mandate, but they are not faced with the regular uncertainty of elections either.  
So, the lesson in this case is that while small size can deepen community participation 
in the way that participatory and deliberative democrats presume, it can also lead to 
instability, deep factionalism, and, as I will discuss further below, personality politics and 
patronage-based appointments.  
Considered judgement 
Smith’s (2009) framework is not only interested in deepening citizen participation and 
control of decision-making; it is also concerned with how innovation fosters an environment 
where informed judgements or an ‘enlarged mentality’ can be realised. Arguably, this 
rationale is the most important criterion for understanding innovations to the PAC process in 
Tuvalu. Successive UNDP reports argue that MPs and PAC members should receive more 
training about committee rules and procedures (Morgan and Hegarty, 2003; Loney, 2009). 
Moreover, the high rotation of MPs, either during elections or votes-of-no-confidence, is said 
to limit the development of effective institutional memory on the PAC.  
Whether the co-opted members improve the capacity of the committee to make 
informed judgements is a matter of considerable contention. Some interviewees agree with 
the view that the co-opted member provides continuity, stability and institutional memory to 
what is otherwise a fairly fluid membership. Others argue that while the co-opted member is 
contributing, problems relating to the capacity of the committee to understand complex 
financially matters remain, as one MP outlined (author interview, 2014): 
The current member … is contributing … especially on issues that are of interest [or] 
he has some knowledge … [But] its quite difficult for him to understand as well. 
Perversely, a similar point is made about one of Tuvalu’s other main democratic 
innovations – sending bills to island communities for comment and amendment – as this MP 
argued (author interview): 
We already requested the Office of the Speaker and the Attorney General that a legal 
person from the Attorney General’s office should be available when each island 
discusses this legislation, because, as I see it, it is a waste of time.  … People do not 
understand it … the decisions are so complicated and [they are] not even in the local 
language. 
In the case of the PAC, the Rules of Procedure 2008 provide for the Auditor General 
to act as an adviser to the committee – and this is a practised convention – which, in theory, 
should aid informed deliberations. Moreover, the Audit Office briefs the PAC on the contents 
of its reports prior to the commencement of hearings and assists with drafting the final report. 
The advantage of this arrangement is that Audit Office staff are well-versed in the subject 
matter. The disadvantage is that it takes them away from their core role. Ideally, parliament 
would fund its own secretariat staff but, given resource constraints, this has not been possible. 
So, the lesson is that small size creates capacity problems that, despite innovative reform 




The question of informed judgement then turns on the selection of committee 
members with the necessary skills and expertise to make use of this advice. The Speaker 
decides on the required three from the pool of ‘ordinary’ MPs. In most cases, this pool is 
made up of former ministers from the previous government or, after elections, new members. 
The general view is that selection of the co-opted member was highly politicised. In small 
states, strong cultures of compliance and community activity often operate alongside deep 
factionalism; community bonds run deeper but so do enmities (Richards, 1982, p. 160). In 
this vein, Hassall (2012, p. 225), for example, notes systemic problems with the nature of 
committee appointments in the Pacific, including their use as a vehicle of political patronage.  
Personal loyalties and antipathies are central to political practice in Tuvalu, including 
appointments to the PAC, with most interviewees asserting that the position of co-opted 
member became a spoil of office to be distributed by the winning majority and the Speaker in 
particular, and that this practice has undermined the initial intent of improving capacity. In 
response, there is some discussion about creating criteria against which a merit-based 
selection could be applied. However, when ‘everybody knows everybody’, all such processes 
attract critique from the unsuccessful party. Supporters of particular co-opted members, for 
example, believe that regardless of political affiliations they were the best person for the job. 
Moreover, alliances change and so while a co-opted member may be appointed by a 
particular parliamentary faction, the fact that some co-opted members, for example, stayed 
longer than the government who initially appointed him suggests that either the position was 
not as highly politicised as some interviewees claim, or, that co-opted members were 
themselves adept political operators.  
Transparency 
By transparency, Smith’s (2009) framework seeks to ascertain how open processes 
are to outside observers: do citizens know what is going on? How are proceedings 
communicated? Like inclusiveness, small states are said to have a natural level of 
transparency in that the highly personalised nature of daily life means that little can be hidden 
from public view (Wettenhall and Thynne, 1994, p. 68; Corbett, 2015). Values often 
described as ‘traditional’ include reciprocity, status, gift-giving and family ties, are all central 
to social relations in Tuvalu. Naturally, this spills over into elections, although, in such 
circumstances, gift-giving is usually intentionally conspicuous with prospective candidates 
making presentations to influential leaders, key supporters and the community as a whole 
(Taafaki, 2004). So, transparency is high but impartiality, independence and strict separation 
between public and private is blurred, spawning accusations of corruption (Larmour, 2012), 
and interminable speculation and gossip about what might remain concealed (Besnier, 2009). 
Taafaki (2004) argues that cultural norms dictate that senior community figures receive 
deferential treatment, with customs officers declining to inspect their bags, for example. And, 
as we saw, accusations of political interference are common, including in relation to the 
function of the PAC.  
Formal oversight mechanisms are largely absent in Tuvalu; the PAC is the main 
oversight body. This has been of particular concern to donors interested in fiduciary control 
of aid funds. The Leadership Code Act 2007 outlines the conduct expected of holders of 
public offices and makes provisions for an Ombudsman, but this position was only filled in 
2014. PAC reports are rarely debated in parliament. There are some exceptions – the late 
2000s are cited as a period when opposition members pushed to have the reports debated – 
but conventionally reports are tabled but not discussed or revisited.  
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In theory, with around half the population located on the main island of Funafuti, 
information about the PAC should naturally disseminate among citizens, with the co-opted 
member aiding this process. As one MP somewhat flippantly commented (author interview): 
[The co-oped member is there so] … that when people ask about the report he can 
explain to them ‘they have gone through that, these people have done their work’. It 
seems as though he is a spy [laughter].  
However, while the co-opted member could function as the ‘people’s spy’, the 
accusation of patronage, discussed above, works against this interpretation, while most 
interviewees argued that the work of the PAC was not well understood outside parliament: 
I think the knowledge stops with the member because unless the report is debated in 
parliament, then the public will [not] be in a position to know what’s happening with 
the public accounts discussion. But otherwise there is no avenue where the co-opted 
member can disclose the issues discussed. (Tuvaluan politician, author interview) 
Parliament attracts a great radio following in Tuvalu and so issues raised in debates 
reach a wide audience. Conversely, Transparency International’s National Integrity Systems 
Study (Taafaki, 2004, p. 22) describes the media environment as ‘ruthlessly censored’ on the 
grounds that all media is government owned and economies of scale work against the 
establishment of an independent press.  
So, the lesson is that small size can provide a natural level of transparency but it also 
works against the clear lines of accountability (including an independent press) so prized by 
the liberal democratic tradition. 
Efficiency 
Since the 1980s, decentralisation has been championed by donors seeking to increase 
efficiency, and by extension economic development, in developing countries (Snyder, Ludi, 
Cullen, Tucker, Zeleke, & Duncan, 2014). However, while Tuvalu’s population is a little 
over 10,000 living on a land area of 26 km2, it has a vast oceanic exclusive economic zone 
(900,000 km2). Interviewees argue that this combination of small population, archipelagicity 
and large water expanse works against the efficiency that donors prescribe elsewhere. Recent 
research by The World Bank finds a strong negative correlation between optimal public 
financial management performance in the Pacific and the small size of the countries 
concerned (Haque, Knight and Jayasuria, 2012; Pelizzo, 2010; O’Brien, Stapenhurst and 
Prater, 2012). In this view, small polities suffer from capacity constraints. 
Tuvalu’s parliament generally only meets a few times a year for a period of five days 
at a time. In relation to the PAC, it can be a logistical challenge to disseminate background 
material and hold meetings outside these periods if MPs are in their constituency (aside from 
the capital, all islands are serviced by ship). Secondly, resource constraints mean that 
Tuvalu’s parliament has no permanent facilities but rather meets in a multi-purpose 
meetinghouse or maneaba (Loney, 2009). Apart from physical facilities, support services, 
including for legislative drafting, library and research, committee secretariats, Hansard, 
management of human and financial resources, and the establishment and maintenance of 
information technology and internet services, are either absent or irregular (Hassall, 2012, p. 
214). And, as we have seen, costs prohibit parliament employing its own committee 
secretariat and work against the establishment of an independent press.  
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The ubiquity of questions about efficiency in this context is further highlighted by the 
controversy over whether and how much co-opted members ought to be paid for their work 
on the PAC. MPs are entitled to a sitting fee of US$70 per day (US$75 for the chairman), 
which, in Tuvalu, is a reasonable amount of money. The PAC sits for between 2-4 weeks per 
year. However, the PAC report for the financial year ending 2012 (tabled on 13 January 
2014) notes that officials and co-opted members were not getting their sitting allowances and 
recommends a future budget line to rectify this.  
Interviewees were divided over the question of remuneration. Some felt that co-opted 
members should be paid in line with MPs (this had been the established practice). Others 
argued that, as the position had become increasingly politicised, co-opted members did not 
provide value for money. The Attorney General’s opinion of 11 April 2013 is that co-opted 
members are not entitled to allowances on the grounds that the Prescription of Salaries Act 
only provides for the payment of the Governor General, Prime Minister and MPs. According 
to Section 45 (7) of the Rules of Procedure 2008, co-opted members must be MPs and only 
then can they collect allowances.  
In either case, the important lesson is that small size can be costly and inefficient due 
to the absence of economies of scale. 
Transferability 
The question of transfer permeates the history of democratic institutions in Tuvalu, 
and so, in many respects, it is difficult to know where to start with Smith’s (2009) final 
criterion. As we saw, Tuvalu’s institutional architecture could be described as an example of 
ill-conceived transfer of political institutions ostensibly designed for and by a large state 
(United Kingdom) onto a small one. From this perspective, the changes discussed here can in 
part be construed as an attempt to overcome the shortfalls of the initial design. As Wettenhall 
and Thynne (1994, p. 83) argue, smallness ‘sensibly propels’ governments to innovate and 
the best solutions usually emerge from within. By this logic, Tuvalu’s experience is very 
much a product of its distinctive history and scale, and as such has little to offer other states 
interested in these questions. This may be true in the sense that all such reforms are products 
of a particular history; but that does not stop us considering how aspects of the Tuvaluan 
approach might be applied elsewhere. Certainly, given that organisations like UNDP have 
been central to existing reform efforts in Tuvalu, we might expect them to consider whether 
the transfer of these arrangements to other countries is worthwhile. 
The most obvious form of transfer would be to other small states where similar 
capacity deficits are apparent. While much of this article is concerned with the question of 
whether ‘small is beautiful’, the spirit of that phrase nevertheless recognizes that the 
experience of small states can contribute to our wider understanding of political and human 
affairs (Murray, 1981, p. 249), and the most immediate practical lessons are for countries of a 
similar size. However, while other small states might be interested in aspects of this 
innovation, the case study has shown that the process has not been without its challenges. 
Indeed, while this particular ‘solution’ may have partly emerged from ‘within’, actors 
continue to debate whether it worked  
There is no obvious reason why the type of innovation trialled by Tuvalu’s PAC 
could not be transferred to large states, but there are numerous arguments for why it is 
unlikely. Most obviously, the rationale for co-opting members would be entirely different in 
large states where parliaments are less likely to lack MPs with specific technical expertise. 
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Moreover, the problem of ministers reviewing their own budgets can largely be 
avoided in larger parliaments by simply selecting former government backbenchers as 
committee members. As such, in large states the rationale for co-opting members of the 
public would more likely stem from a desire to deepen citizen participation in decision 
making. However, while it may be normatively desirable to have ordinary citizens rather than 
professional politicians overseeing government expenditure, selection still poses a problem. 
‘Ordinary citizens’ would have to be defined and identified. As in Tuvalu, this process would 
be highly politicised, and, eventually, calls for greater democratisation would follow. This 
might take two forms: 1) a nation-wide ballot, like jury service or citizen juries (Smith and 
Wales, 2000), in which selection was random; or 2) an election. The problem with the latter 
option is that it is not entirely clear how these elected ‘ordinary citizens’ would be different 
to the average MP.  
In either case, the Tuvaluan experience suggests that democratic disaffection remains 
despite changes to the PAC and the longer running reforms initiated via the Falekaupule Act 
1997. In turn, this poses key questions for those advocating ‘scaled down’ democracy in large 
states. 
Conclusion: reconsidering the normative potential of small size 
The ‘small is beautiful’ proposition assumes that large states have much to be gained 
by ‘scaling-down’ their institutions in order to deepen and strengthen citizen participation. 
The Tuvaluan case is an inversion of this logic as the co-option of members of the public 
onto the PAC might best be described as an attempt to ‘scale-up’ its procedures by increasing 
the capacity, and by extension authority, of parliamentary oversight regimes. Rather than 
large size being a problem, the consensus among the actors canvassed here is that being small 
is a barrier to the performance of the Parliament of Tuvalu. Using Smith’s (2009) framework, 
I identified the following challenges that arose from Tuvalu’s PAC innovation:  
1. Small does not always mean inclusive or egalitarian: certain groups, including 
women and youth, remain marginalised from both the PAC and other representative 
processes in Tuvalu; 
 
2. Small size can provide a natural level of transparency but it also works against 
the clear lines of accountability (including an independent press) so prized by the 
liberal democratic tradition; 
 
3. Small size can create capacity deficits that, despite innovative reform attempts 
like those outlined here, make it difficult to retain the skills required to run institutions 
created for large states (especially across vast territories); 
 
4. Small size can create a deep sense of community of the type that participatory 
and deliberative democrats extol, but it can also lead to instability, deep factionalism, 
personality politics and patronage-based appointments;  
 
5. Small size can be costly and inefficient due to the absence of economies of 
scale; and 
 
6. Small size does not necessarily reduce democratic disaffection, despite 
extensive attempts to reform institutions in the ways that deliberative and 
participatory democratic theorists suggest.  
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When seeking general lessons from the Tuvaluan case, we might argue that, as an 
extreme example of smallness, there is little to be learnt aside from emphasising that 
somewhere between ‘small’ and ‘large’ exists the ideal size of a democratic polity. Haque et 
al. (2012, p. 24) argue that a population size of 500,000 represents such a threshold in their 
study of public financial management performance, where citizens no longer seek to adapt 
democratic institutions on the grounds that they are too ‘small’ and instead focus on problems 
of ‘largeness’, namely by prescribing devolution and decentralisation. The problem with this 
argument, however, is that it is not borne out in Tuvalu where the Falekaupule Act 1997 was 
explicitly designed to decentralise decision-making so that it better reflected community 
opinion. Elsewhere among the small states of the Pacific, a similar dynamic unfolds, with 
citizens demanding ‘grassroots’ institutional reform to address the perceived failure of 
governments to meet their needs (Larmour, 1999). Nauru (population 10,000) has both a 
local and national government (Wettenhall and Thynne, 1994). And Palau (population 
20,000) has a federal presidential system along the lines of the US: it has a 25-member 
bicameral parliament and each of its 16 states has a legislature, governor, lieutenant 
governor, bureaucracy, Council of Chiefs, etc., including the state of Hatohobei (population 
100) (Veenendaal, 2016). 
As a representation of this more general trend, the Tuvaluan case asks us to consider 
whether there is a naturally optimal size of a democratic polity, as all governments, no matter 
their size, face pressures to decentralise (Veenendaal and Corbett, 2015). Theoretically, this 
interpretation supports recent moves by political geographers to critically examine the ways 
we present different scales as static and reified categories. Practically, the lesson for large 
states seeking to ‘scale down’ and small states seeking to ‘scale up’ democratic institutions is 
a cautionary one: normative appeals to ideal scales of decision-making do not disappear, no 
matter how small or large a polity is. As we have seen, ‘scaling-down’ may ameliorate some 
of the problems that scholars identify with the practice of politics in larger states, including 
the creation of a polity where ‘face to face’ interactions are the norm, but the Tuvaluan case 
illustrates that these same advantages inevitably generate problems of their own (Veenendaal, 
2015; Erk and Veenendaal, 2014). 
So, when it comes to democracy, is small really beautiful? At the very least the 
Tuvalu case shows that (like large states) in practice the situation is more complex than it 
appears at face value; and much of this complexity stems from the interplay between size and 
institutional design. As we have seen, many of the challenges actors see as confronting the 
practice of democratic politics in Tuvalu stem from ‘smallness’. We might argue, as many 
interviewees have, that the PAC initiative was poorly conceived and requires amendment. 
We could also argue that the PAC innovation was limited by factors other than size, 
including economic capacity and community education. The UNDP, for example, has 
recommended a community education campaign about the role and function of parliament, 
which falls in line with the deliberative democratic focus on ‘rationality’, so that confidence 
in the institution might be enhanced (Loney, 2009). However, these additional factors can 
also be directly attributed to the problem of small size, and so they do not solve the broader 
theoretical question. Small may be beautiful to some, especially when looking in from the 
outside, but from the inside it provides constant challenges of the type that large states often 
manage to avoid. So, the lesson for deliberative and participatory democrats from one of the 
world’s smallest states is that size matters but not necessarily in the manner theory predicts or 
in ways that fulfil normative desires. 
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